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The Soviet Union, Turkey and the Cyprus Problem, 1967-1974

The Soviet Union, Turkey and the Cyprus Problem, 1967-1974 John SAKKAS and Nataliya ZHUKOVA The Cyprus conflict cannot be analysed and understood in depth as long as the determining political influence and the degree of involvement of external agents in Cyprus are not taken seriously and systematically into account. This paper focuses on the attitude of the Soviet Union towards the Cyprus issue from 1960 to 1974 and examines its strategic objectives in the eastern Mediterranean in relation to regional actors such as Turkey and Greece. The authors’ central hypothesis is that the 1974 invasions took place for reasons other than those claimed publicly by Turkey – to protect its minority (around 18 per cent of the total population) and to prevent enosis (union) of the island with Greece – and that the Soviet Union, mainly for geopolitical reasons, acquiesced with Turkey’s central policy of restoring the balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean.

Turkish control of Cyprus, the third largest island in the Mediterranean, ended in 1878 when the Ottoman Sultan transferred the administration of the island to Britain. Coveted as a naval platform for British power in the Middle East, the new colony had from Antiquity been Greek in population and culture, with a Turkish minority introduced after Ottoman conquest in the 16th century. At the outset of World War I Britain annexed the island and Turkey and Greece recognized British sovereignty over Cyprus by the treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Turkey, in particular, relinquished all its rights on Cyprus under the treaty, as Kemal’s basic aim at the time was the preservation and the building of modern Turkey on the geopolitical matrix of Anatolia.

After the end of World War II the Greek Cypriots began to forcefully demand self-determination, which would lead to enosis. In 1954-1958, Greece raised the Cyprus question at the United Nations, but its attempts failed, due to opposition from Turkey, Britain and the United States. Turkey favoured the preservation of the statu quo in Cyprus or partition, while Britain regarded Cyprus as a Mediterranean stronghold it had not the slightest intention of relinquishing. In 1958, Greece agreed, under American pressure, to a negotiated settlement and gave up the idea of achieving enosis through the United Nations. Deeply concerned about the possible impact of a too blatant division of Cyprus on a Greek political scene where popular feelings on the issue ran high, the United States had for some time viewed independence as one way out of a potentially dangerous conflict between allies. Therefore, they opposed self-determination of the island and insisted on direct talks between the interested parties (Britain, Greece and Turkey – but not the Cypriots themselves). After the Zurich – London agreements in February 1959 the Republic of Cyprus was proclaimed on 16th August 1960. [1]

In late 1963, communal fighting broke out in Cyprus when President Makarios proposed constitutional changes with the intention of creating a more conventional democracy in Cyprus, with a unified administration and majority rule. Turkey sought support for its position in the United States, but the Americans were reluctant to enter into what was seen as a local discord between two members of the same alliance and to impose a solution that would alienate either Greece or Turkey. When the Turkish government informed its allies that it had decided on unilateral intervention, Washington responded with a famous letter (5th June 1964), in which President Lyndon B. Johnson strongly advised Prime Minister Ismet Inonu against the use of military force and proposed American mediation. [2] The Turkish intervention was cancelled but the American schemes (Acheson plans) for “double enosis”, dividing the island into portions to be allocated to Greece and Turkey, were rejected by both countries.

In April 1967, a pro-American military regime was established in Athens aiming, among else, at implementing a solution of the Cyprus issue based on plans drawn by the Americans in 1964. In contrast, Makarios sought to remain independent and to maintain Cyprus non-aligned. This stance brought him in direct conflict with his right-wing opponents in Cyprus, who now had formidable backing in Athens. To them, Makarios was not only a traitor to Hellenism, but a stalking-horse for Communism. On 15th July, tanks of the National Guard in Cyprus attacked the Presidential Palace, and Makarios was replaced by the puppet government of Nikos Sampson. Then Ankara made use of its right as a guaranteeing power of the Cypriot state and in a two stage operation (20th-22nd July and 14th-16th August 1974), invaded and occupied close to 36% of Cyprus. [3] Since then Cyprus has been divided by the so-called Green Line, patrolled by the United Nations, and no state except Turkey has recognized the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

Soviet Policy towards Cyprus
After Cypriot independence the Soviets became increasingly interested in Cypriot affairs for a variety of reasons. Traditionally, they sought to increase their influence in the eastern Mediterranean, an area connecting their territories on the Black Sea with their vital interests in the Middle East. The importance of Cyprus in the region was obvious. It was the site of two important British bases, which were of strategic value to NATO and its most dynamic political party, the communist AKEL (The Progressive Party of the Working People) exerted significant influence on the Greek Cypriots. Moreover, the Cyprus problem provided the opportunity to encourage the disruption of the south-eastern flank of NATO. The prospect of detaching Turkey even slightly from NATO seemed as important for Moscow as maintaining Cyprus non-aligned.

The Soviet Union firmly supported the continuing existence of a unified and demilitarized Cyprus and consistently opposed the partition of Cyprus – in fulfilment of enosis with Greece or “double enosis”. The underlying logic of Kremlin analysts was that the attachment of a portion of the island to the territory of a member or members of NATO would greatly increase the likelihood of Cyprus being used as a site for a NATO base – hardly any other scenario would be a worse nightmare for the Soviet Union. Besides, the island had already served as a forward base for British forces invading Egypt in 1956. [4]

For the communist superpower, the 1964 crisis in Cyprus was nothing more than a NATO excuse to occupy the island. On 15th August, an official Soviet statement warned that “if a foreign armed invasion takes place against the territory of Cyprus, the Soviet Union will help Cyprus to defend its freedom and independence”. [5] The following month, Soviet arms and equipment were promised and delivered to the extent of $70 million worth by October 1965. In 1967, Cyprus imported a large number of Czech arms, which were used to create a paramilitary force within the police. By the end of the 1960s Cyprus and the Soviet Union had established close diplomatic, commercial and cultural relations, as signified by unofficial exchanges, the opening of a Soviet cultural centre in Nicosia, the numerous personnel in the Soviet Embassy and the admission of a large number of Cypriot university students to the Soviet Union. [6]

After the establishment of the military regime in Athens, the Soviets felt that the threat to their interests in Cyprus came more from Greece than from Turkey. On several occasions they expressed concern about or issued warnings against foreign interference in the internal affairs of Cyprus. And they continued to regard Makarios as a legitimate ruler. In June 1971, they invited him to attend the enthronement of the new Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Pimen. Makarios visited Moscow, Leningrad, Zagorsk, Volgograd and Kiev and had talks with Podgorny and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. They discussed, among else, the state of bilateral affairs, the Cyprus issue, and the critical situation in the Middle East. The joint statement expressed a wish for the success of the inter-communal talks based on the “absolute sovereignty and unity of the state”. In 1972, the Cypriot government decided to enlarge its military capabilities with arms from Czechoslovakia. This caused the fierce reaction of Greece and the United States, and at the end the arms were given to the UN mission in Cyprus and were kept there until 2001. [7]

According to the Russian archives, the Soviet Union played a significant role in organizing Cyprus’ state security through AKEL and in protecting Makarios from attempts on his life. Moreover, in 1973 AKEL received from the Soviet Union 140,000 dollars through the international fund of help for left-wing working organizations. And, at the beginning of July 1974, on the request from AKEL, the Soviet Union sent secretly to Cyprus 100 guns and 2.500 cartridges to protect the party leaders from the provocations and terror by the nationalist organization EOKA-B. [8]

Turkey’s Rapprochement with the Soviet Union
The 1945-1960 period, during which Turkey’s foreign policy was dominated by total Western dependence, was followed by a period of disillusionment with the West, late détente with Eastern bloc and rapprochement efforts with the Third World (1960-70). President Johnson’s tough diplomatic intervention in June 1964 against Turkey’s planned invasion of Cyprus was the catalyst which prompted Ankara to re-evaluate its foreign policy. Turkey’s leaders were forced to recognize that their strict adherence to a pro-Western alignment in a rapidly changing international system had left the country virtually isolated in the world community. [9]

A number of factors, related to the Cyprus issue, forced Turkey to consider rapprochement with the Soviet Union. First of all, Turkey felt that its opening to the Soviet Union would alarm the United States, leading it to reconsider its own stance on the Cyprus issue. Secondly, it hoped to win positive Soviet support for its position on Cyprus, and therefore, secure the support of the Communist bloc in the United Nations. Finally, the least that it could expect was a neutral Soviet position, thereby denying support for the Greek position. Beyond the deteriorating effects of the Cyprus crisis and the Johnson letter, there were other problems concerning Turkish-US relations, which pressurized the Turkish government to re-examine its relations with the USA : the growing anti-American sentiment in Turkey because of American involvement in domestic affairs (military bases and alleged covert activities of the CIA) ; the “liberal” constitution of 1961, which allowed free discussion of foreign policy as a political issue ; the extreme fragmentation of the Turkish political system in the 1960s ; the radicalization of the Turkish youth and the emergence for the first time in Turkey’s history of a genuine socialist movement, which advocated the destruction of Turkey’s ties with the West and the normalization of relations with the non-aligned and communist countries ; [10] and, finally, the strong American reaction to the cultivation of opium poppies in Turkey. [11]

Economic considerations played an important, if not crucial, role in influencing the course of Turkish foreign policy. Turkey’s economic system was modeled along Western lines and relied heavily on American economic aid. During the period 1947-1961 Turkey received $1,862 million in military assistance and $1,394 million in economic assistance from the United States. And when faced with bankruptcy in 1958, Menderes accepted the stabilization programme imposed by an international consortium composed of the United States, Germany, Great Britain, the European Payments Union, and the International Monetary Fund. In return the consortium rescheduled Turkey’s debts and provided an aid package of $359 million. At the same time, the Menderes government tried to link its economic policies with the West through the European Economic Community. In 1959, Turkey applied for an associated status in the EEC. However, at the beginning of the 1960s American economic and military aid to Turkey declined and the leaders in Ankara began to consider rapprochement with the Soviets in order to obtain economic aid. [12]

We cannot explain adequately Turkey’s shift in foreign policy without taking into consideration systemic factors. As Soviet parity in long-range missiles became evident, the NATO policy of “massive retaliation” was replaced by the principle of “flexible response”. This, and the question it raised about the role of countries on the flank of NATO in case of war, prompted Turkey to take initiatives, improve and expand its relations to the countries of Eastern Europe and the Third World, in order to take full advantage of its economic and political potential. Bulent Ecevit, who replaced Inonu as party chairman in May 1972, believed that Turkey could afford to adopt an assertive, in contrast to Inonu’s cautious, foreign policy vis-à-vis the superpowers. There was no question of Turkey abandoning its alliances, such as NATO and CENTO, but within the alliances Turkey would pursue a policy designed to serve its national interests. [13]

An additional factor was the more flexible and lenient Soviet foreign policy that emerged after Stalin’s death in 1953. This policy was based on the principle of peaceful coexistence with neighbouring peoples (Arabs, Turks, Iranians) and with countries committed to different political, social, and economic systems. With regard to Turkey, the new Soviet leadership renounced its territorial claims to Turkey’s eastern provinces and its desire for control of the Straits. In April 1960, Turkish premier Menderes agreed on exchanging visits with Khrushchev as a result of mainly Turkey’s need for economic assistance. However, Menderes was ousted by the military coup of 27th May 1960, which caused a Turkish-Soviet standstill for another four years.

The real thaw in Turkish-Soviet relations started after the 1964 Cyprus crisis and Khrushchev’s fall from power in October. Khrushchev had been friendly to Makarios since he perceived him as the only man who could ensure Cyprus’ non-alignment and independence. The new Soviet leadership, however, gave priority to its relations with Turkey. Foreign Minister Feridun Erkin visited Moscow at the end of October 1964 and the joint communiqué issued at the end of the visit stated that both countries respected the independence of Cyprus and acknowledged “the legal rights of the two national communities”. [14] The Soviet Union’s shift towards Turkey was confirmed on 21st January 1965 when Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko stated that the two Cypriot “national communities… may choose a federal form of government”. [15] Turkish policymakers were clearly pleased with this evenhanded approach which they justifiably considered to be a development in their favour. They responded by declining to participate in the NATO multilateral force. Its creation was something the Soviet Union was strongly opposed to as it would have associated West Germany with the use of nuclear weapons. In December 1965, when the Cyprus problem was debated in the General Assembly, the world body came up with the strongest resolution so far in favour of the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus and of opposition to any external intervention in the island’s affairs. But the resolution was passed with 54 abstentions. The Soviet Union and the eastern European countries were among them. [16]

After Premier Alexei Kosygin paid a visit to Ankara in December 1966 Soviet-Turkish relations took the form of closer economic ties. The Soviets believed that economic aid to, as well as smooth economic relations with less-developed countries would certainly promote the gradual elimination of Western predominance, while widening the opportunity for more Soviet influence. Turkish exports to and imports from the Eastern bloc expanded rapidly and their share in Turkey’s total trade increased from 7 per cent in 1964 to 13 per cent in 1967. In 1967, Demirel visited Moscow and the Soviets agreed to build a number of industrial plants in Turkey, including a steel mill, an aluminum smelter, and an oil refinery. By the end of the 1960s, Turkey became the recipient of more Soviet economic assistance than any other Third World country. [17] In 1972 and 1978, the two states signed a declaration of “principles of good-neighbourly relations” and a “political document” of friendly relations.

The Cyprus Crisis in Summer 1974
The circumstances surrounding the Greek junta – sponsored coup against Makarios and the Turkish invasions of July and August 1974 have been examined in detail elsewhere. [18] Here we will focus on the Turkish strategy and motives as well as on the Soviet attitude during the invasions. In the meeting of the National Security Council late in the evening of 15th July Finance Minister, Deniz Baykal, suggested that a military intervention in Cyprus had become inevitable. As a result of détente the superpowers’ reaction to regional crises had changed. Instead of interfering, the superpowers had begun to appease the parties in regional conflicts, and states which took the initiative and created fait accompli were now in more favourable positions. Then he remarked : “The most important aspect of today’s coup is not the installation [to power] of Sampson, the murderer of Turks and British, but the inevitability that Greece would soon be our southern neighbour. Greece is about to take this last step. This should be prevented”.

Ecevit supported Baykal’s remarks and argued that as a result of the coup, central and southern Anatolia were within the range of the Greek air force. [19] These words prove beyond any doubt that the prime motivation of Turkish policy in Cyprus was strategic. Turkey’s first invasion of 20th July represented the implementation of a version of the Acheson plans, with its troops taking over the Turkish Cypriot enclaves on the Kyrenia-Nicosia axis. It seems that the Turkish military saw this as a great opportunity to partition Cyprus with the long-term aim of putting under its strategic control the entire island. Cyprus was the gateway to Turkey’s southern flank and control of Cyprus would mean control of the entire eastern Mediterranean basin. Inversely, Cyprus, either independent or in union with Greece, would put the Greeks in an advantageous geostrategic position in control of air and sea communications. As Foreign Minister Gunes put it in the National Assembly on 22nd May 1974, Turkey wanted to live in peace with Greece, but “just because this is so, Greece will certainly not be allowed to gnaw away at Turkish interests in any manner whatsoever or to upset the balance between the two countries”. [20]

Following the collapse of talks in Geneva, Turkey launched a second, full-scale invasion on 14th August 1974, resulting in the occupation of about one-third of Cypriot territory and creating a huge refugee problem, as some 250,000 Cypriots were forcefully displaced. Turkey’s second invasion inevitably undermined its argument that its action was initiated to protect the Turkish Cypriot minority on the island from Greek nationalists. Rather, the Turkish action served to persuade the international community to go along with Greece’s balanced suggestion that the invasions were both immoral and, from the point of view of international law and the constitutional settlements of 1960, totally illegal. [21]

Beyond security and geopolitical considerations Ecevit’s decision to invade Cyprus was also affected by his conviction that Turkey had a unique chance this time to act assertively and create a fait accompli with reasonable prospects for a favourable outcome. The American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was reluctant to antagonize Turkey, an ally with a major strategic importance for the USA. As he cynically told President Ford, there was “no American reason why the Turks should not have one-third of Cyprus”. [22] And in order to help Turkey reach its territorial objectives he adopted a “wait and see” approach and throughout the crisis he remained strongly opposed to a military option to avert the invasions. By giving the green light to Turkey to handle Cyprus in its own way Kissinger hoped to restore the balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean and to appease the Turks. After the invasions, the US Congress, partly under pressure from the Greek-American lobby and partly because of American domestic politics, imposed an arms embargo on Turkey. But the embargo was opposed by the President, the State Department and the American Military. It was partially lifted in the late 1975 and was fully lifted in the summer of 1978.

The coup against Makarios in July 1974 convinced the Soviet leaders that the military regime in Athens aimed at enosis, which would bring Cyprus under the firm control of Greece and thus NATO. In its first official statement on 16 July, the Soviet government expressed its support for the people and the legal government of Cyprus and laid the blame exclusively on “Greek militarists” and on NATO, which “inspired the actions of the Greek junta”. [23] Likewise, the second Soviet government statement, issued two days later, referred to “certain NATO circles” that could not reconcile themselves to “an independent Cyprus with a non-aligned foreign policy”. [24]

When the Turks invaded Cyprus, Moscow kept a rather ambivalent attitude. Neither supported the Turkish intervention nor the regime in Nicosia. Initially, it felt satisfied with the declarations of the Turkish government that the invasion aimed at the “restoration of constitutional procedures” and the return of president Makarios to power. [25] Likewise, the Soviet press justified the Turkish invasion as a logical reaction to the Greek intention of annexing Cyprus and transforming it into a NATO base. On 21st July, Pravda commented that the Turkish government had motivated its actions by the necessity to protect the Turkish-Cypriots and that it had decided to intervene militarily after making sure that all peaceful resources to solve the conflict had been exhausted. Moreover, Pravda, echoing the Soviet government’s view that NATO was using Cyprus to consolidate its military-strategic positions in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, linked NATO’s machinations around Cyprus to Israel’s “aggression” against Arab countries. It was evident that the Soviets were much more concerned with the balance of power and stability in the region than with the fate of Cyprus itself. [26]

Soon the Soviets were to realize that the Turkish troops were not ever going to leave Cyprus and that Makarios’ return was not desirable. However, they refrained from criticizing, even implicitly, either Turkey or the US. The government statement of 28th July pointed out that : “Certain NATO circles are working towards confronting the world with the fait accompli of the partition of the country, or at least creating the conditions of such a partition… In effect, an effort is being made to consolidate the occupation of the island, to tear it asunder, and this is happening in the sight of the entire world”.[27]

And in the 1,000-word government statement of 22nd August there was not even an indirect reference to the Turkish factor. Criticism was directed vaguely against unnamed imperialist forces or member-states of NATO : “The situation in and around Cyprus remains tense. The militarist circles in NATO are not ceasing their attempts to liquidate the Republic of Cyprus as an independent and sovereign state pursuing a policy of non-alignment, and to dismember it, making the territory of Cyprus a NATO stronghold in the Eastern Mediterranean. The imperialist forces are playing a criminal game, harming the interests of the people of Cyprus, resorting to the most unseemly means and violating international law and the United Nations Charter. A putsch and crude military interference are being followed by behind-the-scenes diplomatic manoeuvres behind the backs of the people of Cyprus and to the detriment of their interests”. [28]

The main general Soviet objective during the Cyprus crisis was to maintain its good relations with Turkey and to exploit the Turkish-American differences. Another important objective was to obtain a role in any settlement of the Cyprus issue. But the Soviet attempt to bring immediately the Cyprus crisis at the UN was decisively opposed by Britain and the United States. As a response to the negotiations in Geneva exclusively between NATO members the Soviet Union proposed that the Security Council send a mission to Cyprus to verify the ceasefire agreed in Geneva. The proposal failed to receive much support from other members of the Council, and it was never put to a vote. [29] When the second Turkish landing took place, the Soviet Union again condemned NATO’s interference in the internal affairs of Cyprus and emphasized the need to fulfill UN Security Council 353 of 20th July, calling for a cease-fire and an immediate end to foreign military intervention. [30] A week later it proposed the convocation under UN auspices of an expanded conference concerning Cyprus. The conference would be attended by representatives of all members of the Security Council, plus those of Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus ; but late in the evening of 27th August Turkey rejected the proposal outright. Finally, on 30th August, the Soviet Union supported a resolution sponsored jointly by Austria, France, and Britain that called on Greek and Turkish Cypriots to resume direct negotiations and to work within the UN in solving the refugee problem. [31] This resolution marked a definite end to the Cyprus conflict of the summer 1974.

During the 1950s, Ankara believed that the support of its Western allies on Cyprus would make possible a pro-Turkish settlement there. As of the second half of the 1960s, however, Ankara began to realize that its zealous identification with the West hurt its interests in Cyprus and that Turkey needed to break out of the international isolation so clearly manifested in the December 1965 UN vote on Cyprus sovereignty and the illegality of external intervention. The major impetus for Ankara’s new orientation in foreign policy was Johnson’s letter to Inonu on Cyprus. Because Inonu made public that his cancellation of the planned landing was due to US opposition, the letter had a lasting impact on Turkey’s foreign policy. The Turkish government adopted “multidimensional” foreign policy, major element of which was the improvement of relations with former foes, including the Soviet Union and the nationalist Arab states.

In 1974, the Turks did not intervene in Cyprus to restore the constitutional order of 1960 or to interrupt the Greek junta’s plan to unite the island with Greece. Their principal goal was to restore the balance of power in Cyprus by occupying one third of the island and to prevent a Greek-Cypriot axis from dominating the eastern Mediterranean. The Soviets favoured the Turkish designs for their own strategic reasons and undertook no initiative to stop the invasions. Certainly, there were other factors that contributed to Soviet inactivity. Soviet military support was given to countries, which were committed to socialism as the main state ideology. Cyprus was a non-aligned country and had a powerful Communist Party, but it also possessed two British military bases and after the coup of 15th July it was in the grips of the Colonels in Athens. Moreover, the Soviets were conscious of the fact that Cyprus belonged to the western sphere of interests. And they would not risk another military intervention only a few months after the crisis of October 1973 in the Middle East.

  • [1] For the period 1954-1959 see the excellent study Robert Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998.
  • [2] Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1964-1968, vol. XVI.
  • [3] See, especially, Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1999 ; Ian Asmussen, Cyprus at War. Diplomacy and Conflict during the 1974 Crisis, London and New York, I.B. Tauris, 2008 ; B. O’ Malley and I. Craig, The Cyprus Conspiracy, London, I.B. Tauris, 1999 ; J. Sakkas, “Conflict and Détente in the Eastern Mediterranean : From the Yom Kippur War to the Cyprus Crisis, October 1973-August 1974”, in Antonio Varsori et al. (eds), Crisis and Transformation : The Mediterranean from Détente to the Second Cold War (to be published by I.B. Tauris).
  • [4] Andreas Stergiou, « Soviet Policy towards Cyprus », The Cyprus Review 19/2, Fall 2007, p. 83-106.
  • [5] Pravda, 16 August 1964.
  • [6] For an analysis of Turkish-Soviet relations from a Soviet viewpoint, see Boris Potskhveria, Foreign Policy of Turkey after the Second World War, Moscow, 1976 and Alexei Rodionov, Turkey. The Crossroads of Destinies, Moscow, 2006.
  • [7] Mikhail Oshlakov, The Freedom Saga. History of Modern Cyprus, Moscow, 2010, p. 164.
  • [8] The Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI), 89/51/30.
  • [9] Suha Bolukbasi, The Superpowers and the Third World : Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus, London and New York, University of Virginia, 1988, p. 89.
  • [10] Mustafa Audin, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy : Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War”, Middle Eastern Studies 36/1, January 2000, p. 118.
  • [11] For this issue, see S. Bolukbasi, The Superpowers and the Third World…, op. cit, p. 173-175 and James Spain, “The United States, Turkey and the Poppy”, Middle East Journal, vol. 29, no. 3, summer 1975, p. 297-299.
  • [12] M. Audin, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy…”, op. cit., p. 110-111.
  • [13] Bulent Ecevit, Dis Politica, Ankara, Ajans Turk, 1976, p. 18.
  • [14] Izvestiya, 7th November 1964.
  • [15] Izvestiya, 22nd January 1965.
  • [16] United Nations Doc A/5552/ADD.I.
  • [17] S. Bolukbasi, The Superpowers and the Third World…, op. cit, p. 118-119. [18] See I. Asmussen, Cyprus at War…, op. cit. et J. Sakkas, “Conflict and Détente in the Eastern Mediterranean…”, op. cit.
  • [19] S. Bolukbasi, The Superpowers and the Third World…, op. cit, p. 188-189.
  • [20] Ibid., p. 176.
  • [21] See the arguments of Vasilis Fouskas, “Reflections on the Cyprus Issue and the Turkish Invasions of 1974”, Mediterranean Quarterly, 12/3, 2001, p. 98-127.
  • [22] FRUS, memorandum of Conversation between Ford and Kissinger, 13th August 1974.
  • [23] Zayavlenie TASS, Pravda, 16th July 1974.
  • [24] Ibid., 18th July 1974.
  • [25] Kipr : Vosstanovit’ Konstitutsionnii Poryadok, Pravda, 25th July 1974.
  • [26] Zayavlenie Sovetskogo Pravitel’stva, Pravda, 21st and 28th July 1974 ; 4th August 1974.
  • [27] Ibid., 29th July 1974.
  • [28] Printed in Soviet News, 3rd September 1974. [29] UN Documents S/PV 1787. [30] UN Documents S/PV 1794. [31] UN Documents S/ 11479.

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